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Abstract
Background: Dunn et al. performed a critical review identifying some problems in the Somatic Marker
Hypothesis (SMH). Most of the arguments presented by Dunn focused on the insufficiencies for replication
of skin conductance responses and somatic brain loops, but the study did not carefully reassess the core-
task of SMH. In a related study, Lin and Chiu et al. identified a serious problem, namely the "prominent
deck B phenomenon" in the original IGT. Building on this observation, Lin and Chiu also posited that deck
C rather than deck A was preferred by normal decision makers due to good gain-loss frequency rather
than good final-outcome. To verify this hypothesis, a modified IGT was designed that possessed high
contrast of gain-loss value in each trial, with the aim of achieving a balance between decks A and C in terms
of gain-loss frequency. Based on the basic assumption of IGT, participants should prefer deck C to deck A
based on consideration of final-outcome. In contrast, based on the prediction of gain-loss frequency,
participants should have roughly equal preferences for decks A and C.
Methods: This investigation recruited 48 college students (24 males and 24 females) as participants. Two-
stage IGT with high-contrast gain-loss value was launched to examine the deck C argument. Each
participant completed the modified IGT twice and immediately afterwards was administered a
questionnaire to assess their consciousness and final preferences following the game.
Results: The experimental results supported the predictions regarding gain-loss frequency participants
choose the deck C with nearly identical frequency to deck A, despite deck C having a better final outcome
than deck A. The "sunken deck C" phenomenon is clearly identified in this version of IGT which achieves
a balance in gain-loss frequency. Moreover, the "sunken deck C" phenomenon not only appears during the
first stage, but also during the second stage of IGT. In addition, questionnaires indicated that normal
decision makers disliked deck C at the consciousness (explicit) levels.
Conclusion: In the modified version of IGT, deck C was no longer preferred by normal decision makers,
despite having a better long-term outcome than deck A. This study identified two problems in the original
IGT. First, the gain-loss frequency between decks A and C is pseudo-balanced. Second, the covered
phenomenon leads to most IGT related studies misinterpreting the effect of gain-loss frequency in
situations involving long-term outcomes, and even leads to overstatement of the foresight of normal
decision makers.
Published: 6 August 2007
Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 doi:10.1186/1744-9081-3-37
Received: 7 April 2007
Accepted: 6 August 2007
This article is available from: http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
© 2007 Chiu and Lin; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
Page 2 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Background
Damasio [1-4] extended the James-Lange theory with
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) to not only explain
the generation of subjective feeling but also the factors
guiding decision making. Bechara et al. [5,6] then
designed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to demonstrate
the operation of Somatic Markers in ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC) deficits and normal decision mak-
ers. In the serial studies conducted by Bechara et al. [5,7,8]
normal controls gradually shifted their choice from the
bad decks (A and B) to the good decks (C and D), but
VMPFC deficits preferred the bad final-outcome decks (A
and B) throughout the game.
In the original construction of IGT, bad decks A and B pos-
sessed relatively large gain-loss and disadvantageous final-
outcome, while good decks C and D had relatively small
gain-loss and advantageous final-outcome. Decks A and C
contained five gains and five losses, while decks B and D
contained nine gains and one loss in each circle of ten tri-
als. The gain-loss frequency is balanced, with 14 gains and
6 losses between the bad (A and B) and good (C and D)
decks in IGT (see Table 1).
SMH assumed that normal participants can achieve fore-
sight by the help of somatic system; namely, they can
obtain final benefit via implicit processing of emotion
while performing the IGT. VMPFC deficits can not inhibit
the preferences of such participants regarding the immedi-
ate large-gain decks A and B without the involvement of
VMPFC function and the somatic system.
During recent years, the Iowa gambling task (IGT) has
been become a critical task in research on affective func-
tion and decision-making under uncertainty. Bowman et
al. [9] mentioned that the IGT has been applied in over
100 neurological and psychiatric studies. Recently, the
IGT has also been utilized in neuroeconomics and psy-
chology studies [10,11].
Nevertheless, Dunn et al.[12] conducted a global review
for SMH and IGT and pointed out that IGT, skin conduct-
ance response (SCR) and somatic brain loops were three
cornerstones in support of the Somatic Marker Hypothe-
sis. Dunn et al. have summarized a significant body of
inconsistent evidence demonstrating the inability of SCR
and somatic brain loops to guide beneficial decisions.
Notably, there have been few attempts to directly evaluate
the core-task of SMH, namely IGT, with the exception of
the "prominent deck B phenomenon" proposed by Lin
and Chiu et al.[13].
Lin and Chiu et al.[13-15] pointed out a serious con-
founding in the IGT, and that Bechara et al. misinter-
preted the result of IGT to fit the SMH. One critical piece
of evidence is the "prominent deck B" phenomenon; spe-
cifically, even normal participants can not inhibit their
preference for the high-frequency gain deck B with bad
final-outcome. This phenomenon completely contradicts
the principal assumption of the IGT. Lin and Chiu et
al.[13-15] suggested that participants' behavioral decision
was dominated by gain-loss frequency, not long-term out-
come. In the study of Lin and Chiu et al.[13-15], partici-
pants preferred decks B, C, D to deck A. The high-
frequency gain for decks B and D (nine gains and one
loss) rather than deck A (five gains and five losses) is rea-
sonable; however, the above prediction is against the
basic assumption inherent in deck C (five gains and five
losses) in IGT. Lin and Chiu et al.[13] explained the rea-
son participants preferred deck C to deck A is due to that
deck C contains fewer losses than deck A; for example
deck C has five gains and five standoffs (rather than five
losses) during the first ten trials. The five standoffs result
from the setup of "paying $ 50 and earning $ 50" in the
trial (five of ten trials). Participants therefore actually
experienced 5 gains and 5 standoffs (standoff: net value is
$ 0 within a trial) in deck C which possessed a superior
gain-loss frequency to deck A (see Table 2). For an average
of 40 trials of the IGT table, deck A contains 5 gains and 5
losses; however, deck C contains 6.25 gains, 2.5 draws and
only 1.25 losses. Consequently, from this perspective, the
gain and loss probability between bad deck A and good
deck C is not equal as Bechara et al. suggested [5]. That is,
the gain-loss structure between decks A and C is pseudo-
balanced (e.g. based on the suggestion by Bechara et al.,
the gain-loss frequency of decks A and C was balanced
with 5 gains and 5 losses; however, according to the net-
value account, deck A still contains 5 gains and 5 losses,
whereas deck C contains 6.25 gains, 2.5 draws and 1.25
losses over an average of 40 trials) in Iowa group's original
proposal.
However, there is no direct evidence that the fewer loss (of
deck C) are the main reason participants prefer deck C to
A.
To obtain such evidence, this study provided a modified
IGT (see Table 3). In this modified task, all gain-loss val-
ues were almost doubled in each trial to make the five
losses of deck C visible, while keeping the final outcome
the same as in the original IGT. This manipulation
increased the contrast between gain and loss, and
increased participant sensitivity to the embedded rule of
each deck. As suggested by the Iowa group, the change in
gain-loss frequency and immediate value have less effect
on the participants' penetration to long-term benefit
[5,16]. For example, Bechara et al. [16] modified the IGT
by changing all "+" signs to "-" in each trial; thus, two
good decks (+250) will become two bad decks (-250) and
vice versa. In this version of the IGT, Bechara et al. foundBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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Table 1: The gain-loss structure in the original IGT.
IGT A B C D
1 100 100 50 50
2 100 100 50 50
31 0 0 ,   -150 100 50, -50 50
4 100 100 50 50
51 0 0 ,   -300 100 50, -50 50
6 100 100 50 50
71 0 0 ,   -200 100 50, -50 50
8 100 100 50 50
91 0 0 ,   -250 100, -1250 50, -50 50
10 100, -350 100 50, -50 50, -250
11 100 100 50 50
12 100, -350 100 50, -25 50
13 100 100 50, -75 50
14 100, -250 100, -1250 50 50
15 100, -200 100 50 50
16 100 100 50 50
17 100, -300 100 50, -25 50
18 100, -150 100 50, -75 50
19 100 100 50 50
20 100 100 50, -50 50, -250
21 100 100,-1250 50 50
22 100,-300 100 50 50
23 100 100 50 50
24 100, -350 100 50, -50 50
25 100 100 50, -25 50
26 100, -200 100 50, -50 50
27 100, -250 100 50 50
28 100, -150 100 50 50
29 100 100 50, -75 50, -250
30 100 100 50, -50 50
31 100, -350 100 50 50
32 100, -200 100, -1250 50 50
33 100, -250 100 50 50
34 100 100 50, -25 50
35 100 100 50, -25 50, -250
36 100 100 50 50
37 100, -150 100 50, -75 50
38 100, -300 100 50 50
39 100 100 50, -50 50
40 100 100 50, -75 50
Final 
Outcomes
-1000 -1000 +1000 +1000
Gain-loss 
Frequency (in 
average 10 
tirals)
5 gains 5 losses 9 gains 1 loss 5 gains 5 losses 9 gains 1 lossBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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that final-outcome remains the primary guiding factor for
decisions (namely, positive final-outcome decks were pre-
ferred by most normal subjects). Based on Bechara et al.
serial finding, choice behavior is less influenced by other
factors (e.g., gain-loss frequency).
If the proposal of Lin and Chiu et al. [13] is applied, the
standoff is the critical factor for generating the differences
between decks C and A, and participant preferences
should be similar between decks A and C. Restated, the
difference should be reduced because deck C had identical
gain-loss frequency to deck A (5 gains and 5 losses) in this
investigation. Nevertheless, if deck C is also selected more
frequently than deck A in the modified IGT, the hypothe-
sis regarding gain-loss frequency may require reconsidera-
tion.
Methods
This investigation recruited 48 college students (mean
age, 20.67 years old; SD, 1.23; age range, 19–22 years old)
who were from different departments and participated in
this experiment as a course requirement in psychology to
perform this modified version of IGT. The position effect
was counterbalanced by 24 card-position arrangements
(e.g. ABCD, ACDB, ADBC ...DABC). In each case card-
position was performed by two participants (one male
and one female) to control gender differences. Further-
more, each participant was required to perform the same
game twice to trace long-term participant preferences after
the completion of first 100 trials in the modified IGT. This
experiment adopted the original instructions for subjects
performing the IGT [8,16]. All principal points of IGT
instruction were adopted and are listed as follows:
" 1. In front of you on the screen, there are four decks of cards
A, B, C, and D.
2. I want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the
card, from any deck you choose.
3. Each time you select a card from a deck, the color of the card
turns red or black, and the computer will tell you that you won
some money. I won't tell you how much money you will win.
You will find out along the way. Every time you win, the green
bar gets longer.
4. Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the com-
puter tells you that you won some money, but then it says that
you also lost some money. I won't tell you when you will lose or
how much you will lose. You will find out along the way. Every
time you lose, the green bar gets shorter.
5. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to another
any time you wish.
6. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible
and, if you find yourself unable to win, make sure you avoid los-
ing money as much as possible.
7. I won't tell you for how long the game will continue. You
must keep on playing until the computer stops.
8. You will get this $2000 credit (see the green bar) to start the
game. At the end, we will see how much you won or lost. The
red bar here is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to
play the game.
9. It is important to know that the colors of the cards are irrel-
evant in this game. The computer does not make you lose money
at random. However, there is no way for you to figure out when
the computer will make you lose. All I can say is that you may
find yourself losing money on all of the decks, but some decks
will make you lose more than others. You can win if you stay
away from the worst decks." (Bechara et al., 1999, p. 5474)
Following the two-stage game, each participant immedi-
ately completed a questionnaire regarding their final con-
scious preferences. The questionnaire asked subjects to
recall the number of each deck they chose in the both
games (total 200 trials), and, according to their present
preferences, to allocate 200 trials for the four decks. While
playing the game participants were informed that they
were completely free and unrestricted to play as they
Mean deck preference during first session Figure 1
Mean deck preference during first session. The partici-
pants preferred decks B and D to decks A and C. The high-
frequency gain decks (B, D) seem more attractive to normal 
decision makers. The final-outcome hypothesis of the Iowa 
group is invalidated by the "prominent deck B and sunken 
deck C" phenomenon.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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wished, including the absence of any time restrictions.
Additionally, participants were informed that the internal
regulations (game structure and rules) were identical for
both games.
Results
First Stage
The results of this investigation supported the hypothesis
of Lin and Chiu et al. [13] and indicated that the partici-
pants preferred high-frequency gain decks B and D to
high-frequency loss decks A and C during the first stage
(Figure 1). A two-factor (final-outcome vs. gain-loss fre-
quency) ANOVA (repeated measurement) was used for
statistical testing of the four decks. Decks A and B (bad
outcome]) were compared to decks C and D (good out-
come), but no significant effects were observed in relation
to the final-outcome (stage 1: F (1, 47) = .35, p = .55). In
the gain-loss frequency domain, decks A and C (low-fre-
quency gain) were compared to decks B and D (high-fre-
quency gain), and the difference was significant (stage 1:
F (1, 47) = 48.79, p < .01). Additionally, no significant
interaction was identified between final-outcome and
gain-loss frequency (stage 1: F (1, 47) = .59, p = .45).
The learning curve also indicated that participants' choice
behavior was occupied by the high-frequency gain decks
(B and D) rather than the low-frequency gain decks (A
and C) (Figure 2). Repeated-measurement ANOVA was
performed to test the three factors, including final-out-
Mean number of card selection in blocks during stage 1 Figure 2
Mean number of card selection in blocks during stage 
1. The learning curve between the advntageous decks (A, C) 
and disadvantageous decks (B, D) displays no cross over. 
Based on the suggestions of the Iowa group regarding final-
outcome, participants should gradually shift their choice from 
decks A and B to decks C and D. However, this study does 
not support this proposal.
Table 2: The net value of each trial in the original IGT.
IGT A B C D
11 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0
21 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0
3 -50 100 0 50
41 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0
5 -200 100 0 50
61 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0
7 -100 100 0 50
81 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0
9 -150 -1150 0 50
10 -250 100 0- 2 0 0
11 100 100 50 50
12 -250 100 25 50
13 100 100 -25 50
14 -150 -1150 50 50
15 -100 100 50 50
16 100 100 50 50
17 -200 100 25 50
18 -50 100 -25 50
19 100 100 50 50
20 100 100 0- 2 0 0
21 100 -1150 50 50
22 -200 100 50 50
23 100 100 50 50
24 -250 100 0 50
25 100 100 25 50
26 -100 100 0 50
27 -150 100 50 50
28 -50 100 50 50
29 100 100 -25 -200
30 100 100 0 50
31 -250 100 50 50
32 -100 -1150 50 50
33 -150 100 50 50
34 100 100 25 50
35 100 100 25 -200
36 100 100 50 50
37 -50 100 -25 50
38 -200 100 50 50
39 100 100 0 50
40 100 100 -25 50
Final Outcomes -1000 -1000 +1000 +1000
Gain-loss 
Frequency (in 
average 10 
trials)
5 gains 
5 losses
9 gains 
1 loss
6.25 
gains 2.5 
standoffs 
1.25 
losses
9 gains 1 
lossBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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come (good vs. bad), gain-loss frequency (high vs. low)
and blocks (1 to 5) (see Table 4).
Second Stage
Surprisingly, participant choice patterns were similar in
both games. Participants were not inspired to select good
final-outcome decks C and D after observing their per-
formance (stage 2: F (1, 47) = 2.57, p = .12); however,
high-frequency decks B and D were attractive to normal
decision makers (stage 2: F (1, 47) = 41.50, p < .01) (Fig-
ure 3).
The interaction between final-outcome and gain-loss fre-
quency was also not significant (stage 2: F (1, 47) = .04, p
= .84). Moreover, the learning curve of stage 2 resembled
that of stage 1, and no crossover was observed between
decks A and C or decks B and D (Figure 4). Table 5 lists
details of statistical testing between the three factors, final-
outcome (good vs. bad), gain-loss frequency (high vs.
low) and blocks (1 to 5).
Questionnaire Stage
After completing the two-stage game, subjects were
required to recollect the number of trials they chose for
each deck, thereby recording their preference on a con-
scious level. Furthermore, subjects were asked to distrib-
ute the 200 trials among the four decks to further identify
their preference. The questionnaire data of memory
assessment (Figure 5) and identification of further prefer-
ence (Figure 6) indicated that following the two-stage IGT,
participants are not only unable to foresee deck final out-
come, but were also unable to enter the "hunch" state,
even on level of consciousness.
Discussion
The observations above supported the hypothesis of Lin
and Chiu et al. [13] that participants preferred the deck C
in the original IGT owing to gain-loss frequency, not final-
outcome. Furthermore, the prominent deck B phenome-
non can be identified again in this experiment (Figures. 1,
2, 3, 4). This study demonstrated that the original gain-
loss structure of IGT is pseudo-balanced, particularly
between decks A and C. Deck A possessed five gains and
five losses in the domains of both loss account and net
value (in each trial) (see Table 2), while deck C had five
gains and five losses in the loss account domain, but con-
tained five gains and five standoffs in terms of net value
(in each trial). Actually, some studies identified the vari-
ant choosing-number of deck C, indicating (good final-
outcome) that deck C is sometimes chosen less than (bad
final-outcome) deck B [12,17-27]. Both "prominent deck
B" and "sunken deck C" are inconsistent with the basic
assumption of IGT and indicate that gain-loss frequency is
the main factor guiding player (subjective feeling and
decision-making) in these types of uncertainty game.
Moreover, this study also observed that females are more
sensitive to high-frequency gain than males; however,
gender difference is not significant. The gender difference
for frequency effect may be congruent with observation
obtained by Overman et al. [21,28].
Mean deck preference during second session Figure 3
Mean deck preference during second session. This 
additional session aims to verify learning status after the 
game. The results replicate the finding of the first session, 
with participants being insensitive to the bad final-outcome of 
deck B and the good final-outcome of deck C. The present 
observation invalidates the suggestion of the Iowa group that 
normal decision makers can foresee final benefit.
Table 3: The gain-loss structure in the modified IGT.
Deck Card 
Sequence
ABCD
12 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
22 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
3 -50 200 -50 100
42 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
5 -350 200 -50 100
62 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
7 -150 200 -50 100
82 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
9 -250 -2050 -50 100
10 -450 200 -50 -650
Final Outcomes -250 ($) -250 ($) +250 ($) +250 ($)
Gain-loss 
Frequency
5 gains
5 losses
9 gains
1 loss
5 gains
5 losses
9 gains
1 lossBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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In fact, in the supplementary data of an IGT related study
conducted by Maia and McClelland [29] who reported
their observation on some subjects' account and indicated
subjects' preference to decks B. Maia and McClelland's
report listed as following, which is consistent with Lin and
Chiu et al. [13] and present finding on "prominent deck
B" phenomenon.
"...Furthermore, given that on trial 40 she still seemed to think
that deck B was a good deck ("because the winnings are still
pretty high"), it also does not come as a surprise that she went
back to deck B in the next period (only to lose $1,250 again).
In fact, this pattern is not at all unusual. It often takes two
$1,250 losses in deck B to convince participants to stay away
from that deck. Even then, many (including participant 36)
still go back to that deck a couple of times – sometimes because
they understand that there is usually a series of "safe" $100
wins before the next $1,250 loss, and other times because they
are higher risk-takers... " (Maia and McClelland, 2004, sup-
porting text p. 11)
On the other hand, in Maia and McClelland's additional
data also pointed out that (as listed below) actually, the
immediate losses of deck C was too small and often
ignored by subjects. Namely, the experimental control in
terms of gain-loss frequency between decks A and C in
original IGT were obviously pseudo-balanced. Partici-
pants preferred to choose deck C is not due to the good
final-outcome, but due to the high-frequency gain and
standoff (rather than deck A) in IGT.
"...Between trials 40 and 70, she plays 26 out of 30 times from
deck C, which is in line with her stated knowledge about that
deck: "when I lose, I don't lose that much, and sometimes the
wins and the losses cancel out" and "the losses aren't huge and
I usually win or... you know..." (which we interpret as "I usu-
ally win or stay even"). (In fact, most participants find it easy
to figure out that deck C provides them with a net gain..."
(Maia and McClelland, 2004, supporting text p. 11)
Notably the original presentation of IGT possesses a four-
deck format [5] and in the Iowa group data deck B is less
frequently selected. The chosen number of deck B is nearly
equal to deck A. However, since 1994, the four-deck for-
mat of the IGT has mostly been substituted by the two
deck format, simply involving a single good and a single
bad category of decks. Unfortunately, most studies using
the four-deck format were focused on the "prominent
deck B" or "sunken deck C" phenomenon, and thus the
Iowa group's "sunken" deck B (nearly equal to deck A) [5]
appears unlikely to appear in any future studies, though
notably one relatively recent study did contain such obser-
vations. The concern of the present study is identifying the
confounding or methodological problem embedded in
the original studies on the IGT. However, most IGT related
studies utilized the summation of either good or bad
decks to avoid the prominent deck B phenomenon and in
confirming their findings regarding the original assump-
tion of IGT. In studies where the "prominent deck B"
Mean number of cards selected in blocks during stage 2 Figure 4
Mean number of cards selected in blocks during stage 
2. The learning curve in stage 2 also replicated the findings 
from stage 1, with decks A and C exhibiting lower prefer-
ence than decks B and D. Unexpectedly, participants pre-
ferred the high-frequency gain-decks (B, D) to the other two 
decks (A, C) even during the second encounter of IGT.
Table 4: Main effect and interaction of learning curve during stage 1
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df P
OUTCOME 0.35 1 47 0.56
FREQ 42.21 1 47 0.00
BLOCK 213.30 1 47 0.00
OUTCOME * FREQ 0.28 1 47 0.60
OUTCOME * BLOCK 1.13 4 44 0.35
FREQ * BLOCK 0.47 4 44 0.76
OUTCOME * FREQ * 
BLOCK
0.91 4 44 0.47Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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applies, the issue is related to a pure academic argument,
that is, an explanation is needed for why the "prominent
deck B" phenomenon was not identified by over 100
research studies during the past 13 years. Serious ques-
tions need to be asked about why related research has
always conformed to the hypothesis of the Iowa group.
This issue rapidly requires careful reconsideration and
exploration, before the IGT becomes a formal neurologi-
cal or psychological assessment. The present study not
only identified the misinterpretation of final-outcome in
the original IGT, but also identified another powerful fac-
tor influencing decision makers' cognition in the face of
uncertainty, namely gain-loss frequency [14,15].
Although, the "prominent deck B and sunken deck C" is
incongruent with the original hypothesis of SMH, but
both phenomena are more congruent with the behavioral
decision literatures [30-34], affective neuroscience [35,36]
and animal studies [37-40]. IGT is the core task in con-
structing the SMH; nevertheless, some critical variables of
IGT suggested by Iowa groups are no more predictive.
Additionally, not only have critical problems in IGT been
identified, but physiological problems involving the
somatic system of SMH have also been identified
[20,29,41-48]. IGT has gradually become extremely
important in affective neuroscience and neuroeconomics,
and SMH has provided critical perspectives regarding the
relationship between the emotional brain and decision-
making. Nonetheless, the evidences presented here indi-
cate that IGT and SMH should be carefully reevaluated
before being accepted as convincing tool and theory.
In addition, there have increasing number of IGT related
studies with normal subjects demonstrating that subjects
preferred the high-frequent deck B rather than high-EV
deck C [17,19,20,49]. Particularly, Wilder et al. [18] in
1998 have described the similar observation in control
subjects. Their critical description for the IGT inconsistent
result was listed as bellow.
"... Moreover, both normal control subjects and schizophrenic
patients appear to have been influenced by the immediate
rewards, based upon both groups' choice of frequent rewards
and infrequent penalties in Decks 'B' and 'D', rather than the
long-term profits and losses associated with the task. The overall
pattern of the two groups appeared to demonstrate that both
were behaving according to the principle that large, infrequent
penalties have less of an impact on long-term strategy than do
frequent, small penalties. This being said, it should be noted
that the groups still chose the 'good' decks (C and D) more than
the 'bad' decks (A and B)...However, we did not find precisely
the same pattern of deck preference with our normal control
that Bechara et al. found... " (Wilder et al., 1998, p. 172)
Moreover, actually in MacPherson et al. [50] launched the
Iowa gambling task to explore the function of ventrome-
Participant memory assessments in the modified IGT Figure 5
Participant memory assessments in the modified 
IGT. Following the two-session games, participants were 
asked to answer the following question: "Please recall the 
number of trials you assigned for these decks during all 200 trials 
of the two-session game". This result of questionnaire almost 
identified the behavioral choice pattern in figure 1 and 3. The 
questionnaire data confirmed that participant conscious 
memory is consistent with their choice pattern.
Table 5: Main effect and interaction of learning curve during stage 2
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df P
OUTCOME 2.56 1 47 0.12
FREQ 41.55 1 47 0.00
BLOCK 0 1 47 1.00
OUTCOME * FREQ 0.04 1 47 0.84
OUTCOME * BLOCK 0.82 4 44 0.52
FREQ * BLOCK 0.80 4 44 0.53
OUTCOME * FREQ * 
BLOCK
0.77 4 44 0.55Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:37 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/37
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dial prefrontal cortex with comparing the age difference.
However, this study obviously indicated that subjects pre-
ferred the high-frequent decks B and D rather than decks
A and C as suggested as following.
"...participants tend to show a preference for Decks C and D
when performing the gambling task, whereas in this experiment
participants showed a preference for Decks B and D. However,
the current findings of a preference for Decks B and D have also
been reported in healthy participants by Wilder, Weinberger,
and Goldberg (1998). This pattern of performance indicates
that participants were influenced by instant rewards rather
than by the longer term profits and losses associated with the
task. Participants seemed to believe that the small frequent pen-
alties had a more negative impact on their long-term profit than
the large infrequent penalties. Indeed, studies of risk-taking
behavior and gambling have demonstrated that an individual's
choices are not affected by the amount of money already won or
lost on previous trials but the ratio of wins to losses (Greenberg
& Weiner, 1966). Furthermore, when individuals are faced
with ambiguous information and have to make decisions, they
rely on the encoding of frequency information rather than the
amount of reward (Hasher & Zacks, 1984)... " (MacPherson
et al., 2002, p. 607)
In summary, the IGT is the core task of SMH for compar-
ing decision behaviors between VMPFC patients and nor-
mal controls on behavior and psychophysiology.
However, the "prominent deck B" and "sunken deck C"
phenomena are not problems for the IGT that can be
ignored. If the two phenomena are the true, the final-out-
come will be no longer a predictive variable under uncer-
tainty. Namely, decision-makers are unable to make
foresighted decisions by cumulating and calculating the
internal (somatic) markers, which represent external
events precisely. Based on the inconsistent evidence
[12,17-27] and present observations, we suggest that
somatic markers may operate according to gain-loss fre-
quency of external events, not final-outcome. This obser-
vation may be helpful in not only refining interpretations
of IGT and SMH results, but also clarifying the relation-
ship between choice behavior, reasoning and affective
operation.
Conclusion
This investigation demonstrated that the "prominent deck
B" and "sunken deck C" phenomena are observable in
this modified IGT. The hypothesis of Lin and Chiu et
al.[13] regarding gain-loss frequency supported, but the
basic assumption of the Iowa group regarding final-out-
come was invalidated. The basic concept of the IGT is
extremely original and the test is useful in simulating real-
life decisions. However, the IGT contains some redundant
procedures, confounding features, and problems in inter-
pretation. These problems should be refined to make the
IGT a truly useful assessment tool.
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